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Labor Union Group Legal Service for Members
Eugene Green*
R EPEATED CHALLENGES by Bar Associations against the efforts of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen to provide its members with
legal services culminated in the case of Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Virginia, ex rel Virginia State Bar.' Prior to Trainmen, chal-
lenges by the Bar were usually sustained by the Courts.2 Grounds for
the challenges were that the Brotherhood was engaged in the unlawful
practice of law, and in schemes designed to stir up litigation. Lawyers
agreeing to act as counsel for the Brotherhood were accused of know-
ingly participating in arrangements in which litigation was being solic-
ited, of assenting to such solicitation,3 and, in some instances, of split-
ting fees with laymen.4
* Member of the Ohio Bar; of Youngstown, Ohio.
1 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
2 In re Petitien of Committee on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Association, 15 Ohio
L. Abs. 106 (1933); In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d
163 (1958); In re O'Neill, 5 F.Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); Hulse v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (S. Ct. Mo. 1960); Beck v. Lush, 170 Neb. 376,
103 N.W.2d 136 (1960). But cf. Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 268 Ill. App. 3C4 (1932)
describing the union's legal aid plan as commendable and socially needed.
3 The Canons of Professional Ethics held to be violated by the Bar were American
Bar Association's Canons of Ethics Nos. 28, 35, and 47.
Canon 28 provides:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit,
except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to
do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disruptable to hunt up defects in titles or other
causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or
collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for
personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure
them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or
reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such
cases to his office,...
Canon 35 provides:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should
avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the
interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be per-
sonal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. ...
Canon 47, which is complementary to Canon 35, provides:
No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used in
aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency,
personal or corporate.
4 In re Petition of Committee on Rule 28 of the Cleveland Bar Assn., supra note 2.
Here the predetermined fee was 20%, of which 15% went to compensate the attor-
ney and 5% was remitted to the Legal Aid Department. The practice of fee splitting
between the railroad workmen's counsel and the Brotherhood was discontinued in
1959 in compliance with a decree of the Supreme Court of Illinois. In re Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen, supra note 2. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Virginia State Bar, supra note 2, the Supreme Court noted it was not required to
rule upon the validity of fee splitting because the Brotherhood had not engaged in
such practices since 1959.
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In Trainmen, the Virginia Bar challenged the practice of referring
injured workmen or their families to attorneys selected by the union.
As a service to its members, the Brotherhood had created a Legal Aid
Department. This department investigated all the reported work-related
injuries of members. The injured member would be advised to consult
an attorney recommended by the Brotherhood in order that his legal
rights could be evaluated and a determination made of the course of
action that should be pursued. In this way, the Brotherhood channeled
claims and litigation involving its members and their families, arising
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 5 to lawyers selected and
designated by the Brotherhood.
The Virginia Bar sought and procured an injunction from the Vir-
ginia State Courts prohibiting the Brotherhood from continuing its plan.
The Brotherhood resisted the action of the Bar on the grounds that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, guaranteeing free speech, association,
petition and assembly, barred the State from interfering with its main-
tenance of a Legal Aid Department for the benefit of its members. It
appealed the State Court's proscriptions to the U. S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court agreed that the Brotherhood's program of providing
legal assistance to its members for the vindication of federal statutory
rights was within the purview of, and protected by, the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution. It, accordingly, vacated the
decree and reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia.
The Court stated that the principles it had enunciated in NAACP v.
Button,6 upholding the right of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People to recommend attorneys to persons in-
volved in matters directly related to the purposes of the Association,
and to hire attorneys for litigants involved in civil rights litigation, were
applicable to the Railroad Brotherhood. It observed that, "... the Con-
stitution protects the associational right of the members of the union
precisely as it does those of the NAACP." 7 It also ruled that, ". . . law-
yers accepting employment under this constitutionally protected plan
have a like protection which the State cannot abridge." 8
The Court acknowledged that States have broad powers to regulate
the practice of law and noted the State's and Bar's interest in Canons of
Ethics prohibiting the encouragement of warrantless litigation, exploita-
tion of the profession by a lay agency, and aiding the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. Still, the Court held that in the absence of a showing of sub-
stantive evils flowing from the Brotherhood's activities, the
5 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60.
6 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the members
through their Brotherhood to maintain and carry out their plan for
advising workers who are injured to obtain legal advice and for
recommending specific lawyers.9
The Court's approach to the union's connection with the practice
of law assures that the constitutional rights guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments are not so broad as to permit their exercise in
a manner to cause actual, rather than speculative, damage to the public
or the profession. The State's interests in the regulation of the profession
for the purpose of maintaining high ethical standards has not been de-
nied. Rather, it has been affirmed, subject only to the constitutional im-
perative that the control exercised must be on the basis of necessary
protection, and not merely on the remote hypothesis of potential harm.
Hostility to union efforts to provide legal services to their members
continued even after the Court's opinions in Button and Trainmen.10
This hostility was felt by the United Mine Workers of America, District
12, when the Illinois State Bar Association moved to prohibit it from
hiring an attorney on a salaried basis to represent its members to prose-
cute Workmen's Compensation claims before the Illinois Industrial
Commission. The Illinois Bar and Courts saw a significant difference
between the practice of a union recommending an attorney to its mem-
bers and the hiring of an attorney to service members. In their view, the
former practice was protected by the Federal Constitution, but the latter
constituted the unauthorized practice of law beyond the reaches of the
protections afforded by the Federal Constitution.1
The United Mine Workers petitioned for certiorari on the grounds
that the Court's Decree prohibiting it from employing attorneys on a
salaried basis to represent members with Workmen's Compensation
Claims, and other claims which the members may have under the laws
of Illinois, abridged First and Fourteenth Amendment rights upheld by
the Court in Button and Trainmen. The Court granted certiorari. 12
9 Id. The Supreme Court refused the petition for rehearing joined in by some forty-
eight bar associations expressing distress at the violence done to traditional and
universally held principles of legal ethics, and to the authority of the State to
regulate and control the legal profession.
10 Mr. Raymond Reisler, once head of the Unauthorized Practices of Law Commit-
tee of the Bar Association reported that the American Bar Association did not elect
to intervene in the Button case recognizing its unique civil rights aspect; he further
suggested that Brotherhood was confined to its facts, ". . . interesting but hardly
reliable as judicial precedent supporting wide open group legal services in conflict
with the Canons." See (ABA) Unauthorized Practice News, Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 14.
11 In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, supra, note 2, citing People ex rel. Courtney
v. Assn. of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933); In re Maclub of
America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936); Richmond Assn. of Credit Men, Inc.
v. Assn., of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937). Reisler, op. cit. supra, note
10, hailed the State Court decision as a "unanimous landmark decision-defending
the sanctity of the personal lawyer-client relationship against the interposition of the
group as lay intermediary."
12 United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association,
386 U.S. 941 (1967).
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On review of the record, the Court concluded that the Illinois Su-
preme Court interpreted the Court's opinions in Button and Trainmen
too narrowly and that, under the principles announced in those cases,
the First and Fourteenth Amendments gave the United Mine Workers
the right, "to hire attorneys on a salaried basis to assist its members in
the assertion of their legal rights." 13 The Court found no significant dif-
ference between a union recommending an attorney or hiring an attor-
ney. In either instance, the Court pointed out, the attorneys "economic
welfare is dependent to a considerable extent on the good will of the
union .... ,, 14 The Court would not justify a State's prohibition of the
constitutional right of members of a union to aid one another in the as-
sertion of legal rights upon the remote possibility of abuse and harm.
The right of associations to provide their members with legal services
appears to be as broad as the freedom of assembly and discussion pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. These freedoms "are
not confined to any field of human interest" 11 and are of the same dimen-
sion in matters of local or national interest.
Dissenting Justices Clark and Harlan share the apprehensions of the
organized bar and warn that upholding the right of unions to recommend
attorneys, and to hire attorneys, to provide legal services to their mem-
bers will result in lowering the quality of legal representation, and
"... relegates the practice of law to the level of the commercial enter-
prise ... ." 16 Others find in these opinions, ". . . a drastic change in time-
honored concepts regarding the practice of law and the attorney-client
relationship." 17 Time honored principles held to be overturned include,
the direct relationship between attorney and client; the recognition that
a lawyer's services may not be purchased and resold at a profit; that the
undivided allegiance of an attorney precludes his representation or the
acceptance of compensation from anyone whose interests may be adverse
to that of his client; and that legal services may not be advertised,
bought, or solicited.' 8 Misgivings notwithstanding, the right of labor
unions to maintain group legal service plans is established.
No Conflict in Exercise of the Prerogative
The Bar Associations' expressed fears that no man can work for two
masters, particularly an attorney who is paid by a labor organization yet
works for the individual member, will not and should not act to inter-
13 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
14 Ibid.
15 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1944).
16 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, supra, note 1 at 9.
17 American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the
Law, Volume XXXIV, No. 1, p. 20 (1968).
18 Id., at 21.
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fere with the establishment of group legal service by unions. The insist-
ence that individual members' interests will be sacrificed remains un-
supported. 19 Members do not acknowledge that there is any appreciable
danger that the attorney employed by the union will attempt to sacrifice
the interests of the member to further that of the union. In practically
all instances, the interest of the individual and the group coincide. Where
the union supplies the services of the attorney, neither the union nor the
attorney have a financial stake in individual law suits. It is in the inter-
ests of both that the individual member using the services be satisfied.
Members of a union will not continue to assess themselves to pay attor-
neys' fees or to have their dues used for such purposes if they are con-
vinced that the attorney employed does not have their interest at heart.20
In examining the oft quoted assertion that the allegiance of a law-
yer to his client would be disrupted through the employment of the law-
yer by a group, the editors of the Harvard Law Review concluded
that: 21
Such arguments depend upon the highly speculative proposi-
tion that a lawyer will not give the same amount of care to a group-
referred client as he would to an 'ordinary' client. But the per-
sonal attention that an attorney gives a client would seem to depend
more on the lawyer's character than on the means by which the
client comes to him. While a strong lawyer-client relationship is
desirable, it is unlikely that group practice arrangements will
weaken such relationships to any substantial extent. This possible
disadvantage of group practice plans, standing alone, is not likely
to be held sufficient to override the right to associate.
The union members' reliance upon union furnished attorneys grew,
in part, from experience with individual attempts to realize the substan-
tive benefits of collective bargaining agreements. Many courts developed
the view that only the union had standing to seek enforcement of its
collective bargaining agreements. 22 This view was carried over into in-
terpretations of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
Section 301 was frequently held to have not conferred jurisdiction in
19 See, e.g., Weihofen, Practice of Law by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social
Utility, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119 (1934); Note, Practice of Law by Lay Organizations
Providing the Services of Attorneys, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1334, 1344 (1959); Note, Group
Legal Services, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 416, 420 (1965).
20 Justice Black in United Mine Workers notes that:
In the many years the program has been in operation, there has come to
light, so far as we are aware, not one single instance of abuse, of harm to
clients, or any actual disadvantage to the public or to the profession resulting
from the mere fact of the financial connection between the union and the attor-
ney who represents its members.
21 Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 416, op. cit. supra, note 19 at 422.
22 See Volguardsen v. Southern Amusement Co., 156 So. 678 (La. App. 1934); Milk
Wagon Drivers Union v. Associated Milk Dealers, 42 F.Supp. 584 (N.D. Ill. 1941);
MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1950). See also generally, Annot.,
Labor Agreement-Employees Rights, 18 A.L.R. 2nd 352 (1951).
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Federal Courts over suits brought by an individual member asserting
a violation of a Collective Bargaining Agreement.2 3 Of necessity, unions
were required to supply individual members with the services of an
attorney where the litigation sought to vindicate the contractual rights
of the individual members. There is not a single recorded instance in
which it was contended that the union obtained attorney had failed to
diligently or properly represent the individual union member.
Experience teaches that the courts and the bar will develop ap-
propriate protections for the public and the individual litigants where
the attorney is referred or procured by the union. Ethical considera-
tions will continue to be significant. It is certain that on a case to case
basis rules will be developed to resolve actual conflicts of interest and
prevent the commercialization of the practice of law.2 4 It may safely
be said that union maintenance of group services has not adversely af-
fected the standards of the profession and is not likely to cause them
to deteriorate.
The Limitations on the Exercise of the Prerogative
The need for workers to have an opportunity to be apprised of legal
rights and to secure the services of a lawyer at a price the workers
can afford to pay is well understood by labor unions.25 It is recognized
that only the relatively wealthy can afford consistently to consult a
lawyer. Scholars have long pointed out that two-thirds of the families
of workmen have never employed a lawyer,2G and that the cost of in-
volvement in a major legal problem would be catastrophic. The causes
of inadequate legal representation for the typical labor union member
are summarized by Professor Archibald Cox as follows: 27
23 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1953); Schotte v. International Alliance, etc., 84 F.Supp. 669, aff'd 182
F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950); International Assn. of Machinists v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d
692 (7th Cir. 1959); Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1956); United Protective
Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952).
24 See Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers v. Cohen, 182 F.Supp. 608, 617 (E.D.Pa.),
aff'd. 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961); Nelson v. Johnson,
212 F.Supp. 233, 241-42 (D. Minn. 1963); Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814, 817 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); Holdeman v. Sheldon, 204 F.Supp. 890, 892-93 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd. per
curiam, 311 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1962); Moschetta v. Cross, 48 L.R.R.M. 2608 (D.D.C.
1961); Alvino v. Bakery Workers, 48 L.R.R.M. 2609 (D.D.C. 1961).
25 See, e.g., Carlin, and Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 381, 386-423 (1965), (collecting and analyzing earlier authorities); Schwartz,
M., Foreword: Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 279, 286-
295 (1965); Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle
Classes, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 973 (1963); Committee Report on Group Legal Services,
39 Cal. S.B.J. infra, note 28; Clark, and Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An
A.A.L.S. Survey, 47 Yale L. J. 1272 (1938); Llewellyn, the Bar's Troubles, and
Poultices-And Cures?, 5 Law and Contemp. Prob. 104 (1938); Koos, The Family
and the Law (1949); Iowa State Bar Ass'n., Lay Opinion of Iowa Lawyers (1949).
26 Masotti and Corsi, Legal Assistance for the Poor, 44 J. Urban Law 483, 486
(1967).
27 Cox, Poverty and the Legal Profession, 54 Ill. B. J. 12, 14-15 (1965).
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. . . [T]he unfilled need for legal services would seem to center
about two difficulties which it may be impossible to overcome with-
out changes in the organization, or structure, of the legal profession
and, incidentally, in some of the canons of ethics.
The first difficulty is the inability of individuals to meet the
high cost of the legal services that they occasionally require. It is
not that fees are too high. Rendering skilled advice requires time
and training that deserve adequate compensation. The cost of main-
taining law offices is constantly rising. Litigation, especially where
investigatory work is necessary, is expensive at best. Paying even
modest legal fees puts an almost unbearable burden not only upon
the poverty-stricken who obviously cannot bear the cost but also
upon millions in low and middle income groups, unless the case
happens to be one in which the potential recovery is large enough
to merit a contingent fee. With the low and middle income groups
the financial problem is not much different from that of hospital or
surgical costs, which overwhelmed family after family before the
days of group insurance; the need arises suddenly, the cost is dis-
proportionate to income and no savings have been accumulated
against the contingency. This economic segment of society taken as
a class, however, can afford to, and should therefore, pay for legal
services if some way can be found of spreading and sharing the
costs. Indeed, the devising of acceptable methods would seem to
offer many advantages for the profession.
Second, and possibly more important, is the problem of ig-
norance. The ignorance is of two kinds; first, ignorance of the pos-
sibility that legal advice might be helpful and legal remedies may
be available; second, distrust of strange lawyers and ignorance as
to whether and where reliable legal services can be obtained either
without cost or within the limited ability to pay....
Though they recognize the need for providing services for their
members, historically, unions have not, except in the areas of work
connected disabilities, sought to provide their members with legal serv-
ices. Even the United Mine Workers' plan of providing a lawyer at the
union's expense to represent claimants under State Workmen's Com-
pensations Acts has not been widely emulated. In those few instances
where unions have tried to provide the full range of legal services for
their members, the programs were eventually abandoned.
28
More than four years have elapsed since the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Trainmen, and one year since its decision in United Mine Work-
ers. There has not during this period developed a rush by unions to en-
gage salaried attorneys for the purpose of representing their members
28 The Los Angeles Culinary Industry had collective bargaining agreements under
which employers paid an annual sum to a legal aid Trust Fund which hired a panel
of five lawyers, on an hourly basis, for the purpose of giving union members legal
advice on civil problems. See California Bar Assn., Committee on Group Legal
Services, Group Legal Services, 39 Cal. SBJ 639, 670-75 (1964).
The New York Hotel Trades Counsel, for a two year period, retained a salaried
lawyer to advise its members on any legal problem that the members brought to
the attorney. Most of the problems handled by this attorney, as well as the legal
aid panel, concerned the debtor-creditor and landlord-tenant relationships.
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in general, civil, or criminal litigation. The unions' failure or inability
to establish group plans for providing legal services for their members
is not attributable to disinterest. Rather, the real limitation on the estab-
lishment of group legal service by unions is economic. Most unions,
local unions in particular, are usually hard pressed to find the money
needed to provide necessary administrative services incidental to the
policing of collective bargaining agreements. As collective bargaining
agreements become more complex, the need for professional technical
assistance grows. As Justice Frankfurter some time ago pointed out,
As a practical matter the employees expect their union not just to
secure a collective agreement but more particularly to procure for
the individual employee the benefits promised. If the union can
secure only the promise and is impotent to procure for the in-
dividual employees the promised benefits, then it is bound to lose
their support.2 9
More and more unions are called upon to use the services of economists,
statisticians, engineers, lawyers, and doctors, both in the negotiation and
administration of collective bargaining agreements. The union's treasury
will not stretch far enough to provide the members with general legal
service. The time required of the attorney for legal service to the
union in itself frequently strains the capacity of the union to engage
those services. And, the rank and file shows no inclination to allow dues
increases in order to fund a legal services plan.
The concept of group legal services suggested to many opportunities
to fulfill the legal needs of the lower economic classes. While the unions
now enjoy the judicial recognition of their right to practice group serv-
ice, unfortunately, the economic status of most unions will continue to
preclude them from the establishment or implementing of legal programs
for their members.
29 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
348 U.S. 437, 457 (1955). See also Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
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